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4. Finland. From Agrarian to Right-Wing Populism 
 
Ov Cristian Norocel 
 
Introduction 
Political populism has had a sustained presence in parliamentary politics in Finland since 
1959, though in various guises and in varying degrees. Finnish political populism, represented 
by the Finnish Agrarian Party (SMP/ FLP) between 1959 and 1995, was initially 
characterized by an anti-elitist, agrarian-populist component exploiting the center-periphery 
cleavage. Its successor, the Finns Party (PS/SF, initially the True Finns), founded in 1995, 
appears to have progressively moved away from agrarian populism. Indeed, more recent 
developments indicate that the key component in Finnish political populism is a gradual 
concentration on the cultural cleavage, in a manner that can be similarly observed across 
Europe. This particularity of Finnish political populism has been, in turn, reflected by Finnish 
researchers’ efforts to systematize and theorize populism, which initially gave rise to 
diverging conceptualizations. 
 
Research on Political Populism in Finland 
This section provides a historical overview of the parliamentary populist parties in Finland 
and an outline of research on political populism in the country, covering such issues as how 
populism has been defined and to what extent such definitions diverge from or overlap other 
theorizations of populism elsewhere in Europe. A caveat is necessary: I chose to concentrate 
on discussing and reviewing research that deals with those Finnish parties that have, at least 
formally, embraced the basic rules of representative democracy and do not officially condone 
political violence or advocate the overthrow of democratic government. In so doing, I make 
no mention of the extra-parliamentary fringe parties and extremist groups (for a detailed 
account of these groups, see, e.g., Pekonen, 1999). 
 
Unlike elsewhere in Northern Europe, populist parties have maintained a constant, albeit 
uneven, presence in Finnish parliamentary politics since 1959. The rise of political populism 
in Finland was the consequence of a growing group of disenfranchised voters that could not 
keep pace with the country’s rapid social and political transformations in the post–World War 
II period (Arter, 2010, p. 486; Pekonen, Hynynen, & Kalliala, 1999, pp. 46–51; Ruostetsaari, 
2011, p. 108). The agrarian-populist SMP/FLP had its support base among the small farmers 
and unemployed. The SMP/ FLP reflected similar developments in France, where the 
Poujadist movement articulated the opposition of small entrepreneurs and farmers against the 
French political establishment (see Chapter 14 [‘France’] for a more detailed description). 
Indeed, support for the SMP/FLP was concentrated in rural areas, particularly in eastern and 
central Finland, far removed from the capital region in the south. The party was closely 
identified with its chairman Vennamo (1959–1979), a former center-right politician known 
for his opposition to the political line pursued by president Kekkonen (Arter, 2010, pp. 485–
487). The SMP/FLP had its best electoral results in the 1970s and in early 1980 (around 10% 
of the vote). It was included in a coalition government in 1983 (having received 9.7% of the 
vote that year) but gradually lost political support among voters after this. The SMP/FLP 
ceased to exist in 1995 because of serious financial difficulties. Its last chairman, Vistbacka 
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(the party’s only member of parliament in 1995), participated in the founding of a new party, 
to which many of the central SMP/FLP members moved, among them Soini, who was the 
SMP/FLP’s secretary. 
 
Research focusing on the SMP/FLP showed how it managed to exploit politically the social 
transformations that marked Finland in the aftermath of the war: rapid and uneven 
industrialization, mass migration both internally to urban centers and to other countries such 
as Sweden, cultural transformations, and so on (cf. Helander, 1971; Martikainen & Wass, 
2002; Pekonen et al.,1999; Sänkiaho, 1971). Indeed, researchers tend to agree that the 
SMP/FLP espoused a strong agrarian-populist rather than an economically neoliberal appeal 
(unlike similar parties in the rest of Northern Europe, as described in more detail in the 
chapters on Norway and Sweden). Indeed, it employed a classical populist anti-establishment 
theme, claiming to represent the interests of the “forgotten people”—the “common man” in 
the countryside and in the towns—versus a remote and detached political elite in Helsinki 
(Arter, 2010, p. 486; Norocel, 2009, p. 243; Ruostetsaari, 2011, p. 107). 
 
The Finns Party was founded in 1995, with Vistbacka as its first chairman. In 1997, the party 
elected Soini as chairman and witnessed a gradual increase in political support under his 
leadership. The party’s emergence in mainstream Finnish politics was connected to similar 
developments across the region, with several studies highlighting the potential for populist 
politics both in Finland and in Northern Europe, in general (cf. Arter, 2010; Kestilä, 2006; 
Widfeldt, 2000). The Finns Party started to gain attention, particularly after the 2007 
parliamentary elections (when it polled four percent of the vote) and the 2008 local elections 
(more than five percent), in which it won support, in particular, in those areas that had 
traditionally been strongholds for leftist parties but that had more recently experienced 
significant de-industrialization and rising unemployment. In the 2009 European Union 
parliamentary elections, Soini had the highest personal vote share in the country. The major 
breakthrough, however, was marked by the 2011 parliamentary elections when the Finns 
Party polled over 19% of the votes and became the third-largest party, following only the 
center-right conservatives and the Social Democrats. The Finns Party further consolidated its 
presence in parliamentary politics, registering a good electoral score in the 2014 EU 
parliamentary elections. Two representatives were sent to Brussels, and the party was invited 
to become a founding member of the radical right populist party group in the European 
Parliament (Loch & Norocel, 2015, p. 262). 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, several researchers have focused on the more extreme aspects of 
various Finns Party–endorsed candidates. Research has shown that despite these radical 
voices within the Finns Party—such as Halla- Aho, Halme, or Immonen—in general terms, 
the party was oftentimes regarded as centrist social conservative by its supporters (cf. 
Keskinen, Rastas, & Tuori, 2009; Koivunen & Lehtonen, 2011; Loch & Norocel, 2015; 
Norocel, 2009; Pekonen et al., 1999). These analyses notwithstanding, given that the Finns 
Party was generally perceived to have inherited the SMP’s political legacy and its cadre, some 
researchers have claimed the particularity of Finnish political populism (cf. Borg, 2012a; 
Lähdesmäki, 2014; Pernaa & Railo, 2012; Wiberg, 2011), which is discussed in the 
following section.  
 
From a Nordic perspective, the Finns Party seems to have more in common 
with the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) and the Danish People’s Party (DF)—with which it 
shares the original anti-establishment ideological profile—than with the Sweden Democrats 
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(SD), which initially had an extreme-right ideological profile that became more and more 
moderate in order to achieve political respectability and legitimacy (Borg, 2012b, p. 199; 
Jungar & Jupskas, 2014, p. 232; Niemi, 2012a, p. 8). However, as previously mentioned, what 
seems to set apart the Finns Party from its other Northern European counterparts is that it 
never flirted with economic neoliberalism. What positions the Finns Party among the  
parliamentary radical right populist parties in Europe is what researchers deem to be its ethno-
nationalist view, even on matters that pertain to the welfare state (e.g., Norocel, 2009). 
 
A significant share of recent research on populism has focused on the 2011 parliamentary 
elections in a few key collective projects (Borg, 2011; Pernaa & Railo, 2012; Wiberg, 
2011).Much research on populism in Finland addresses overlapping issues, showing how 
successful populist communication coalesces electoral support for the relevant populist party 
and how certain Finns Party politicians stimulate the creation and consolidation of 
communities that are vehemently negative toward gender equality and societal out-groups (the 
Swedish-speaking minority, various migrant communities, the LGBTQ community, etc.) (cf. 
Keskinen, 2011, 2012, 2013; Keskinen et al., 2009; Norocel, 2009; Pyrhönen, 2014; Saresma, 
2014; Ylä-Anttila & Ylä-Anttila, 2015). Most research is empirical rather than theoretical in 
nature, with an explicit focus on the Finnish context (Borg, 2012a; Wiberg, 2011). A few 
exceptions offer a more comparative perspective (cf. Jungar & Jupskas, 2014; Norocel, 2009; 
Widfeldt, 2000). The methodologies ranged widely from quantitative analyses processing 
large data (surveys, exit polls, etc.) to content analyses (media coverage, party manifestos, 
etc.) to qualitative analyses (political speeches, media presence, party manifestos, party 
newspapers, discussion forums, etc.). 
 
At a very general level, the existing literature appears to agree that populism entails a 
polarization between the “forgotten people” and a disconnected elite (geographically through 
its concentration in the southern metropolitan area around the capital, and culturally by its 
cosmopolitan and allegedly multicultural values). In this context, the populists claim to be 
able to politically represent the people’s interests and criticize the consensus culture that 
generally characterizes Finnish politics. Most authors build their theoretical frameworks of 
populism on key texts in the field (see Chapter 2 in this volume), but they underline the 
specificity of the Finnish case and its agrarian roots (cf. Borg, 2012a; Lähdesmäki, 2014; 
Pernaa & Railo, 2012; Wiberg, 2011). 
 
This duality (conservative agrarianism vs. right-wing radicalism) is a consequence of the 
Finns Party’s internal division between two main political wings. For the sake of clarity, two 
main factions within the Finns Party can be identified, although these factions have dynamic 
contours and do not espouse radically different political ideas. Rather, they emphasize 
different aspects of political populism. One faction mainly consists of the former SMP cadre 
that founded the Finns Party in 1995 and is gathered around the Finns Party’s long-standing 
chairman, Soini. This political wing is generally deemed to lean more toward the left on 
socioeconomic issues and maintains a more morally conservative and anti-establishment 
outlook, criticizing the Finnish political culture that is based on consensus. The other faction 
mainly attracts party members who espouse strong nationalistic and outright xenophobic 
views and is coalesced around Halla-aho, one of the radical voices within the Finns Party. 
This political wing is decidedly more inclined toward the radical right, particularly on issues 
concerning immigration, the Finnish national cultural heritage and multiculturalism, the status 
of Swedish as the co-official language of Finland, and European economic integration. 
Consequently, Finnish scholarship has argued that the party is not necessarily a clear-cut case 
of the populist radical right; scholars express reservations about how well the Finns Party fits 
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the right-wing label given that it seems to display a strong left-leaning political agenda on 
economic matters (cf. Borg, 2012b; Elmgren, 2015; Grönlund & Westinen, 2012; 
Palonheimo, 2012; Rahkonen, 2011; Ylä-Anttila, 2014). Additionally, the Finns Party has a 
conservative take on such matters as religion, morality, and law and order (Mickelsson, 2011, 
pp.153–158; Raunio, 2011, p. 205; Ruostetsaari, 2011, pp. 123–124). At the same time, 
several researchers have claimed that the Finns Party’s electoral success is based on the 
party’s growing Euroskepticism and criticism toward immigration policies (cf. Herkman, 
2014; Lähdesmäki, 2014; Mickelsson, 2011; Pernaa, 2012; Railo, 2012). 
 
In sum, the Finns Party appears to display a mixture of nationalism, traditionalism, and 
populism in a welfare chauvinist format (cf. Loch & Norocel, 2015; Niemi, 2012a; Norocel, 
2009; Ylä-Anttila & Ylä-Anttila, 2015). These aspects notwithstanding, the Finns Party may 
undoubtedly be described as an example of complete populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, 
pp. 332–334), characterized by an adamant appeal to the “forgotten people,” by a strong, anti-
elitist stance and, specific to its political genealogy, by an emergent albeit not fully developed 
exclusionary attitude toward various out-groups. 
 
Populist Actors as Communicators 
To date, a few extensive and detailed studies of populist actors as communicators examine the 
different communication styles of several Finns Party front figures (which reflect the 
distinction between the two political factions within the party) and of the party’s lesser-known 
parliamentary and local council candidates (cf. Elmgren, 2015; Keskinen, 2012, 2013; 
Lähdesmäki, 2014; Norocel, 2009; Ylä-Anttila, 2014). Consequently, some studies have 
concentrated on the communication style of the Finns Party chairman Soini (cf. Niemi, 2012a, 
2012b; Norocel, 2009; Ylä-Anttila, 2014), while others have analyzed the communication 
style of Halla-aho, Immonen, and other representatives of the radical right faction (cf. Askola, 
2015; Keskinen, 2012, 2013; Mickelsson, 2011; Norocel, 2009). 
 
Several researchers claim that Finns Party chairman Soini has a particular style in his role as a 
communicator of populist politics (cf. Niemi, 2012a, 2012b; Norocel, 2009; Ylä-Anttila, 
2014). In the Finnish context, Soini’s communication style may be considered as charismatic 
in terms of his personal presentation, his way of addressing his audiences and possible 
voters, his choice of topics, and his ability to coalesce support for his views by means of 
speaking against the political establishment that he allegedly opposes. A rather different 
communication style seems to be employed by the representatives of the other political 
faction. Indeed, the anti-immigration front figure has constantly courted controversy—for 
example, by uttering xenophobic statements under the pretense of testing the acceptable 
boundaries of free speech and by claiming that authoritarian rule is the only solution 
to the Greek economic crisis (Askola, 2015; Keskinen, 2012, 2013; Mickelsson, 
2011). In turn, other Finnish research has investigated the specific ideological positioning of 
the Finns Party candidates for the 2011 parliamentary elections and has found a specific 
articulation of ideological convictions along gender and spatial lines; that is, while the Finns 
Party, in general terms, has a populist, conservative left-leaning position, rural and 
women candidates tend to take more left-leaning populist stances, and the staunchly anti-
immigration wing of the party (gathered around controversial candidates such as Halla-aho) 
differs from the rest of the party with its right economic position (Ylä-Anttila, 2014). 
 
Another avenue of research has analyzed the communication techniques at work in the party 
newspaper Perussuomalainen and in the personal web pages maintained by the various Finns 
Party members (Elmgren, 2015; Keskinen, 2012, 2013; Lähdesmäki, 2014; Norocel, 2009). 
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These contributions show the discursive construction of dichotomous entities: On the one 
hand, the vaguely defined common, native Finns (understood to narrowly overlap the Finnish-
speaking majority), and on the other hand, the “othered” opponents who are presented as a 
threat to the Finnish identity (defined in terms of prominent social status and economic 
affluence, cultural cosmopolitanism, and excessive tolerance of religious and sexual 
diversity). There are no in-depth studies of the ideological construct behind the discourses of 
Finns Party chairman Soini, however, although it is widely known that he wrote his master’s 
thesis on the topic of populism and the SMP, and later published two books on related 
political topics (Soini, 2008, 2014). One aspect keeps together the two political wings 
identified within the Finns Party, and that is the idea that a majoritarian form of democracy 
is the solution to ensure and defend the country’s inherent Finnishness both from external 
threats (such as the EU bureaucracy or supposedly uncontrolled migration) and from internal 
threats (such as the allegedly disproportionate influence that the Swedish-speaking minority is 
having on cultural, political, and economic matters in Finland). The aim is thus to ensure that 
Finland maintains its cultural uniformity and becomes monolingually Finnish (Elmgren, 
2015; Lähdesmäki, 2014; Loch & Norocel, 2015; Norocel, 2009). 
 
Media and Populism 
Some studies indicate that the Finns Party benefited from the intensive media scrutiny of 
party election campaign financing. From 2008 to 2011, the Finnish media focused on the 
main political actors, particularly on the agrarian center-right and on the conservative center-
right (cf. Kantola, Vesa, & Hakala, 2011; Mattila & Sundberg, 2012; Niemi, 2012b). Two 
other themes emerged with the Finns Party’s rise to political prominence— namely, the 
immigration debate and the European economic crisis (with a focus on the consequences of 
Finnish membership in the eurozone). Research has shown that even major parties have taken 
a more restrictive stance on immigration (at least in their interactions with mainstream 
media), favoring a more assimilationist approach; and the Finns Party has capitalized the most 
on the topic (e.g., Keskinen, 2009). In addition, some scholars have argued that the generally 
critical stance of Finnish media toward the European Union (concerning restrictive, common 
EU legislation, the Finnish eurozone membership, the remoteness of EU “institutions” from 
Finland, etc.) and the Finnish mainstream politicians’ reactions to the economic crisis created 
a favorable environment for the growing support for the Finns Party (cf. Harjuniemi, 
Herkman, & Ojala, 2015; Railo, 2012). 
 
After the parliamentary elections in 2011, the Finns Party successfully employed the issue of 
restrictive migration policies and maintained its critical stance on the crisis of the Eurozone to 
further consolidate its voter base (Elmgren, 2015; Niemi, 2012b, 2013; Pernaa, 2012). These 
aspects notwithstanding, the mainstream media became critical of the Finns Party at times 
and did not always accept the party’s readily suggested solutions on these matters as 
politically and socially viable (cf. Herkman, 2014, 2015; Niemi, 2012a). Several studies argue 
that the media debate on these issues was dominated by the Finns Party in the run-up to the 
elections; for example, the party used the Eurozone bailouts to capitalize electoral support 
(Borg, 2012c, p. 250; Niemi, 2012a, pp. 12–14). Research seems to agree that the Finns 
Party’s successful media strategy in the 2011 elections had two main components. On the one 
hand, the Finns Party media communication presented the political mainstream as a collection 
of corrupt, arrogant, and aged political cliques. On the other hand, it accused the mainstream 
media of being a subservient tool in the service of mainstream political parties while insisting 
that the Finns Party be presented objectively in the same media that it criticized (cf. Herkman, 
2014; Niemi, 2012a, 2012b, 2013). By doing so, the Finns Party succeeded in consolidating 
the perception among the citizens that it was the political voice that went unheard and 
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neglected by the media—the very same media that the party was highly visible in. Put 
differently, the Finns Party consolidated its media visibility because it was on full view in the 
tabloid media, in particular, claiming to be ignored by the mainstream media, in general. 
 
In fact, concerning the relationship between the populist party and the media, research 
indicates that the Finns Party and particularly media-savvy chairman Soini were able to 
exploit the so-called populism of the tabloid media, which has generally been critical of the 
political establishment (Borg, 2012c; Niemi, 2012a). A good deal of research indicated a 
juncture appears to exist between the political populist style and the tabloid media’s populist 
approach, the common denominator being their claim of taking the side of the common 
people (cf. Heino, 2006, 2007; Herkman, 2015; Niemi, 2012a, 2013). 
 
Citizens and Populism 
Several studies attempted to sketch the Finns Party voters profile and provide evidence of 
some of the underlying factors that make them decide to vote for a populist party (Borg, 
2012b; Grönlund & Westinen, 2012; Rahkonen, 2011; Suhonen 2011). Once again focusing 
on the 2011 elections, the most important findings are that the voters identify the Finns Party 
as a radical challenger to traditional Finnish consensus politics (Grönlund & Westinen, 
2012; Loch & Norocel, 2015). The analysis of the survey data on the Finns Party voters 
indicated that blue-collar workers and entrepreneurs constituted the largest group of 
supporters (Grönlund & Westinen, 2012), particularly in areas with high unemployment rates 
and large percentages of industrial workers. Voters were fairly evenly distributed across age 
groups. It seems that the Finns Party managed to take over the loyal SMP/FLP voters and also 
activated previously demobilized voters (Borg, 2012b). The division between wealthy, urban 
Finland and the relatively economically deprived peri-urban and rural areas of the country 
was evident, with the Finns Party polling strongest in the predominantly monolingual Finnish, 
sparsely populated, rural areas and in small urban centers (Grönlund & Westinen, 2012). 
The party positioned itself more toward the left on socioeconomic issues (Borg, 2012b). 
Another important aspect was that more men supported the Finns Party than women (Loch & 
Norocel, 2015). Consequently, in the Nordic context, the Finns Party appears to display 
several resemblances with the FrP in Norway. 
 
Several studies examine how populist actors and populist communications resonate in non-
journalistic, online-media such as blogs, forums, and social networks, and the effects of such 
communication on citizens’ knowledge and perceptions of the contemporary challenges 
encountered by the Finnish society (e.g., Askola, 2015; Keskinen, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013; 
Keskinen et al., 2009; Norocel, 2009; Pyrhönen, 2013, 2014; Raittila, 2009; Saresma, 2014). 
These studies generally indicate that successful populist communication in these contexts 
consolidates the party’s electoral support and that specific Finns Party politicians mobilize 
communities against gender equality, openness, and diverse, vulnerable social groups (the 
Swedish-speaking minority, various migrant communities, the LGBTQ community, etc.). 
 
Summary and Recent Developments 
In regard to the topic of populist manifestations in Finland after 1995, this chapter provides a 
review of the authoritative research on populism and populist communication. Most research 
seems to generally examine the ideological components of populism, populist party 
organization, and the relationship between populist parties and the media (both traditional and 
social media), with significantly fewer studies dealing explicitly with citizens’ perceptions of 
the populist message. Besides a great deal of research in Finnish and Swedish, studies in 
English have significantly increased, focusing either solely on populism generally in Finland 
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or on the Finns Party (the only populist party in the Finnish parliament) and other similar 
parties from across Europe in a few comparative studies. 
 
Researchers continue to analyze in greater detail the Finns Party political communication 
while the party appears to further consolidate its position in mainstream politics. The Finns 
Party recorded strong support in the 2014 EU parliamentary elections, polling close to 13% of 
the vote, which in turn translated into two members of the European Parliament. Despite 
insistent invitations from the French radical-right populists, the National Front (FN), the Finns 
Party chose a more center-right, conservative position in the EU parliament, close to the 
British Conservatives and the Danish radical right, the Danish People’s Party (DF). In 
addition, in the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2015, the Finns Party came in second, with 
close to 18% of the vote. Echoing similar developments in Norway, the Finns Party 
eventually joined the center-right cabinet of Sipilä, whose assumed task is to lead Finland 
out of the recession by means of a series of drastic cuts in public spending and a significant 
shrinking of the welfare state. The Finns Party received several important portfolios in the 
Sipilä cabinet, such as foreign affairs and EU matters, defense, the social care and health 
ministry, and the work and justice ministry. These centrist moves notwithstanding, several 
developments suggest that the anti-immigration radical right wing of the party is also very 
active (cf. Askola, 2015; Jungar & Jupskas, 2014; Keskinen, 2013; Loch & Norocel, 2015). 
Illustratively, in 2015, Immonen, a prominent member of the radical right wing, appeared in 
photographs together with members of a well-known extremist group and subsequently 
published a comment on his Facebook profile, committing himself to give his life in the battle 
against multiculturalism. Immonen’s actions were quickly dismissed by Soini and other front 
figures within the party as a simple personal choice and an unfair media smear campaign, but 
they did not answer deeper concerns about the Finns Party moving toward a more obvious 
exclusionary stance toward social out-groups, particularly the Swedish-speaking minority and 
migrant communities, and last but not least, the LGBTQ community. 
 
Clearly, detailed analyses of the effects of the Finns Party participation in government have 
yet to be undertaken. Areas to consider are populism’s impact on mainstream parliamentary 
parties and on policy in general, and populist voters’ and activists’ anti-establishment attitudes 
and levels of trust. 
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